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ABSTRACT 
Under baseline conditions warehouse stockers (n = 23) could earn incentives if their team 
performed above the team quota of 18 cases stocked per hour. They were also subject to 
disciplinary action if they failed to regularly meet individual stocking quotas. In spite of these 
contingencies the stockers failed to receive bonus payments most of the months preceding the 
intervention. The intervention package included a task analysis in the form of engineered labor 
standards. Empirically derived time standards were combined to provide engineered standards 
for all stocking tasks. A specific time duration goal for each task was presented prior to 
execution of each task. Percent of standard time used to complete each task was then 
presented immediately upon completion of each task via a handheld Electronic Performance 
Monitoring (EPM) device. Thus, task goals and performance feedback immediately preceded 
and followed performance of each stocking task. Immediately upon onset of the intervention, 
employee performance increased and eventually averaged 4.46 cases stocked per hour per 
person, an increase of 24% over the baseline phase. Performance was maintained for the 10-
week duration of the study. Team members received the maximum bonus of $300 per month for 
9 consecutive months under the intervention system. Performance levels in a comparison team 
at another warehouse were unchanged during the entire study. Results were discussed in terms 
of expanding the role of Organizational Behavior Management professionals and operational 
and ethical issues associated with EPM technologies. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although Organizational Behavior Management (OBM) has demonstrated 
the robust impact of providing immediate reinforcers to employees 
(Mason & Redman, 1993), many in the field have noted how it is 
often impractical or nearly impossible to provide real-time consequences 
(Dihoff, Brosvic, Epstein, & Cook, 2004; Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 
1991). With the advent of computer-based technologies such as Electronic 
Performance Monitoring (EPM) the potential of real-time feedback 
is beginning to be realized (Berger & Ludwig, 2006; Dihoff, 
Brosvic, Epstein, & Cook, 2004; Epstein, Lazarus, Calvano, Matthews, 
Hendel, Epstein, & Brosvic, 2002; Ludwig, 2003; Terrel, 1990). And 
feedback in OBM interventions is being delivered with virtually no 
delay between units of task performance and feedback regarding the adequacy 
of each unit relative to some standard. The purpose of this study 
was to assess the effects of using wireless data collection and feedback 
technology to implement an OBM intervention package as part of a 
larger warehouse management system (WMS) that offered productivity- 
based monetary incentives to employee teams. 
 
 
Incentives 
 
Monetary rewards, in the form of incentive pay, have been shown 
to maintain higher task performance rates than hourly pay because they 
deliver monetary reinforcers contingent on performance (Abernathy, 
Duffy, & O’Brien, 1982; Bateman & Ludwig, 2003; Honeywell- 
Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell-Johnson, McGee, Culig, & 
Dickinson, 2002; Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985). Furthermore, 
group incentives are often more practical than individual incentives in 
production or manufacturing settings because they are easier to administer 
to a group than to each member (Keeney, 1994). In the present 
study, individual monetary rewards of either $200 or $300 per month 
per group member were made available to employees contingent on 
their groups’ attaining their monthly group performance goals. However, 
employees and their groups were rarely reaching their monthly 
performance goals and earning their incentives delivered contingent on 
goal accomplishment. The incentive system needed to be improved because 
the monetary rewards were not functioning as reinforcers within 
the system. 
 
Incentive programs indirectly provide employees with feedback based 
on an area of performance important to their organization. Typically, employees 
are informed of their performance levels when they receive their 
incentive pay. When a reinforcer, in the form of incentive pay, is attained 
contingent upon high performance, the feedback delivered with the pay 
may also become a conditioned reinforcer (Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 
1991), if it is not already functioning in that capacity. However, feedback 
delivered in this manner cannot also function as a discriminative 
stimulus for an ongoing task performance. This is because it is rarely, if 
ever, delivered while the employees are performing the task or set of 
tasks upon which their incentive pay depends (although feedback at the 
end of one task can act as an analog to a discriminative stimulus for the 
next instance of that task). 
 
There is empirical evidence suggesting that when individualized performance 
feedback is added to an individual performance incentive 
system, individual performance levels improve (Sama, Kopelman, & 
Manning, 1994). Other studies have shown that providing additional 
performance feedback separate from the incentive pay per se raises 
performance over and above levels maintained by incentive pay alone 
(Honeywell-Johnson &Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell-Johnson, McGee, 
Culig, & Dickinson, 2002). Furthermore, feedback that is delivered in 
the midst of the employee’s tasks, proximate to their behavior, could act 
as a discriminative stimulus for the rest of the behavior in that task and 
might thereby enhance the impact of the incentive program. 
 
Like feedback, goals are a necessary component of incentive programs 
because they specify the level of performance required to receive 
the incentive pay (Abernathy et al., 1982). Goals may also serve as discriminative 
stimuli because they indicate the type and quality of behaviors 
that are likely to be followed by reinforcers (Sulzer-Azaroff & 
Mayer, 1991). Incentive programs often use general goals for an entire 
workforce based on an average performance “quota” announced at employee 
meetings or publicly posted, for example, in break rooms. Goals 
such as these are less effective because they are not proximate to the employee 
behavior (Ludwig & Geller, 2001; Wilk & Redman, 1990) nor 
do they specify precise performance-management contingencies for each 
individual employee. In contrast, goals that are delivered in the midst of 
the employees’ task and are customized for their specific tasks may augment 
incentive programs in ways that enhance effectiveness of incentive 
programs already in place. 
 
Until the early 1980s, many warehouse management systems (e.g., 
www.ssaglobal.com) produced paper lists or tally sheets to direct activities 
among the workforce in the warehouse. For example, one paper list 
directed the fork-lift driver to take pallets from one warehouse point to 
another warehouse point. Another list directed an order selector to pick 
an order for a customer. In this context, incentive programs could not 
be associated with proximal goals and immediate feedback while the 
employee performed a task. 
 
Soon after wireless technology became available, many warehouse 
management systems were re-tooled to deliver the directions for work 
on wireless computers. For example, order selectors now carried a handheld 
wireless computer that specified items to be picked for store orders, 
store-by-store. Antecedents such as selection instructions and pick 
quantities began being delivered in “real-time” as they were presented 
to each worker on their respective computer screen one work unit at 
a time. Real-time information regarding employee behavior was also 
fed back to the warehouse that used this information within its quality 
assurance inspection program and to monitor efficiency gains. This 
additional information management and sharing capability permitted 
goals and feedback to be delivered in a way that would enhance existing 
incentive programs. Specifically, this technology provided the logistics 
management, warehouse system designers, warehouse managers, and 
OBM professionals the wherewithal to deliver proximal goals to employees 
as well as immediate feedback when integrated with Engineered 
Standards. 
 
 
Engineered Standards as Goals 
 
Employee behaviors are often aggregated into outcome measures of 
productivity which are most often described as “quantity output over resource 
input” (Sink & Tuttle, 1989). Earlier measures of productivity in 
warehouse settings were often simple algorithms and quotas. The popularity 
of these measures was primarily a function of their simplicity 
given the limitations of existing measurement capabilities. The disadvantage, 
however, was that they were not comprehensive. For example, 
measuring cases per hour ignored the weight, size, shape of the case, 
and travel distance; lines per hour disregarded the number of cases of a 
product line as well as travel distance; dollar volume per day did not 
take into account the size of the order. The measure most frequently 
used in warehouses was cases per hour. Given the amount of variation 
among cases and travel distances, supervisors were forced to make 
an informed guess at the goals they wanted to assign their workers. In 
the absence of better productivity measurements, in many warehouses 
these informed guesses became de-facto goals. 
 
One of the most effective ways to measure productivity was the standard 
versus actual comparison (Keeney, 1994). In work measurement 
terminology, standard represents the allotted time to complete the work 
unit whereas actual represents the elapsed time taken to complete the 
work unit. The engineered labor standard (ELS) represents a specific 
example. Using this method, an Industrial Engineer would subdivide a 
task into its elements, and each element (e.g., travel time) would be 
given a discrete value–an allocated number of minutes or seconds. Values 
were then arrived at based on the activity sampling, group sampling, 
and time-series studies. 
 
According to Kanawaty (1992), work studies involve examination 
of the way an activity is being carried out, modification(s) of the operation 
to reduce wasteful activity, and specification of a time standard for 
performing the activity. Work measurement then allows for the time 
needed for a qualified worker to carry out a task (Kanawaty, 1992). 
Work studies and work measurement became easier and more accurate 
once performance recording was achieved using time-study software installed 
on palmtop PCs. Thus, substantially more accurate engineered 
standards could be and have been developed. 
 
The merits of ELS are many. The estimated time required to complete 
a work task are based on direct observation and the most accurate 
practicable means. Taking multiple timings, such as at the beginning, 
middle, and end of a shift, ensures that the standard times are representative 
and that allowances for such factors as fatigue are taken into account. 
The recorded times provide an empirical foundation that can be 
used as the bases for positions taken by management during management- 
labor negotiations regarding performance standards, as opposed 
to the traditional practice of bargaining based on a de-facto goals that 
are, in effect, heuristics. Finally, engineered labor standards provide 
goals that can be customized for the particular work the employee is 
responsible for performing. 
 
It is important for the success of any incentive scheme that workers 
know the goal they are working toward and any contingencies between 
goal accomplishment and monetary bonuses. At the host company, prior 
to the intervention described below, each morning an office clerk posted 
data regarding performance for the previous day’s work on the breakroom 
bulletin board. Separate data were provided for each functional 
team (e.g., the receiving team, the stocking team, the order picking 
team, and the loading team). Functional team managers held a brief (not 
more than 5 minutes) meeting to announce their team’s work-load for 
the day. For example, the order picking team would be told that there 
would be 63,000 units that needed to be picked. 
 
Thus, goals at the host company were originally distal to the work and 
represented the aggregate work to be completed among all functional 
group members for the whole day. What the daily postings of the performance 
goals (i.e., distal goals) did not provide was a specific goal for 
each work unit (i.e., proximal goal) for each group member. The current 
study used empirically based engineered labor standards as goals. These 
goals were also customized for each work unit and delivered to each employee 
immediately; the employee commenced work on each work unit. 
 
 
Immediate Feedback Through Technology 
 
As previously stated, until recently, most companies used computers 
to track the performance of their workforce; but these computers 
remained in the front office where daily or weekly reports could be 
compiled. While feedback to workers was reliable, it was, nevertheless, 
delayed owing to technological limitations. When companies began 
putting computers on the shop floor, however, employees could 
view their performance during their work shift. The advent of wireless 
technology supported the continued migration of computer capability 
from the shop-floor desktop to the individual employee via 
either a handheld or vehicle mounted computer. Incorporation of labor 
management software (i.e., the ELS) into the wireless technology 
resulted in more valid/accurate productivity measures. Wireless technology 
permitted employees to receive real-time antecedents that 
could prompt and direct their work on a task. Hence, wireless computers 
could conduct real-time performance appraisals that could be converted 
to immediate feedback delivered to the employee during or 
right after completing each task. These new methods represented a 
significant departure from their predecessors in the warehouse, that is, 
paper-based performance appraisals. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The present study utilized an intervention package that included basic 
components of traditional OBM interventions (Johnson, Redmon,& 
Mawhinney, 2001) based on other studies (Agnew, 1998; Bateman & 
Ludwig, 2003; Jessup & Stahelski, 1999) and OBM literature describing 
effective contingencies of reinforcement in the field (Komaki & 
Minnich, 2001; Poling & Braatz, 2001). The current intervention included 
implementation of new, empirically based, engineered labor standards 
used in OBM tactics consisting of (1) proximal goals and (2) immediate 
performance feedback regarding degree of goal accomplishment. These 
intervention components added contingencies to a pre-existing performance- 
based incentive program. These additional contingencies were 
expected to increase and maintain performance levels above levels maintained 
by the pre-existing program. 
 
This study examined the effects of delivering goal time and performance 
feedback in a “paperless” environment where the task antecedents, 
including both the directions to employees (where to stock the 
product and how many to stock) and the time-based goal (how long they 
should take stocking the products), were presented to the workforce on 
wireless handheld units. Immediate performance feedback was presented 
via the wireless technology and was associated with an incentive 
program. In the present study, the often distal relationship between goal 
setting and performance feedback was shifted to real-time, or what 
Baum (1994) calls “proximate contingencies,” in an effort to improve 
stocker performance. 
 
The difference between the pre-existing contingencies and the components 
added to it via the intervention are depicted symbolically: 
 
Pre-existing contingencies 
 
SD] quota announced at the beginning of shift; 
R] stocking product; 
Distal SR] feedback, possible monetary bonus delivered the 
next month, or disciplinary action. 
 
Intervention elements added (in italic) to the contingency: 
Distal SD] quota announced at the beginning of shift; 
Proximal SD] goal times appeared on screen at the beginning 
of each work unit; 
R] stocking product; 
Proximal SR] feedback appeared on screen at the end of 
each work unit; 
Distal SR] feedback, possible monetary bonus delivered 
the next month, or disciplinary action. 
 
The principles of behavior comprising our empirical theory of behavior 
(Hopkins, 1999) related to feedback, goal setting, and performance 
(Agnew, 1998; Baum, 1973; Komaki & Minnich, 2001; Poling & 
Braatz, 2001; Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 1991) combined with empirical 
results (Abernathy et al., 1982; Bateman & Ludwig, 2003; Gaetani, 
Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985; Jessup & Stahelski, 1999; Ludwig & Geller, 
2001; Wilk & Redman, 1990) resulted in our expectation that adding 
the temporally proximal individual goals and feedback to the pre-existing 
incentive pay contingencies should have the effect of increasing 
performance. In this case, workers should experience performance reinforcement 
whether they earn incentive pay or not so long as goal accomplishment 
per se functions as a proximal reinforcer. At the same time, 
workers could ultimately receive tangible monetary rewards contingent 
on their performance improvement that would likely function as additional 
reinforcement for increased performance levels and maintain 
those performance levels reliably and indefinitely into the future. 
 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants and Setting 
 
This study involved an experimental and a post hoc comparison auto parts 
distribution center. The experimental center, located in the Northeastern 
United States, served over 100 retail chain stores, distributed 
most types of auto parts, including batteries, tires, engine parts, and accessories 
from its 400,400 square foot warehouse. This facility operated 
three shifts, 5½ days a week. The study was conducted in a three-level 
mezzanine (see Figure 1) where stockers replenished bins of product. 
Each level of the mezzanine had 4-5 shelving rows of product organized 
by family grouping and categories. Within each row, auto parts were 
organized into plastic bins or in vendor-specific cases that rested on a 
metal shelf. A bar-coded label was placed on the horizontal bar of the 
shelf right below the bin location to identify the bin by aisle, section 
within the aisle, level of the section, and location within the level. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Three-Tier Mezzanine 
 
 
All the stockers at the experimental distribution center, 23 in all 
(21 females and 2 males) participated in the study. Their ages ranged 
from 18 to 35 years (mean = 23.6 years), and they had worked in the 
stocking department from 6 months to 8.25 years (mean = 4.75 years). 
They were paid $10.00 per hour plus productivity incentives (when 
earned) and all were employed throughout the baseline and intervention 
phases of this study. Stockers worked a single shift between the hours 
of 3:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. Sunday through Thursday. Within each 
8-hour shift, there was a 30-minute lunch break and two 15 minute company- 
paid breaks. They all reported to the replenishment supervisor. 
 
A second distribution center in the mid-western United States was 
used as a post hoc comparison group within which none of the intervention 
conditions were introduced to that group. The post hoc comparison 
distribution center was a 295,000 square foot warehouse distributing 
the same products for the same parent company as the experimental distribution 
center. By comparison, this warehouse center shipped to over 
70 retail customers. The post hoc comparison center also had a three level 
mezzanine and was organized like the experimental center (e.g., 
similar product configuration and bin number coding). All 14 stockers 
were female. Their ages ranged from 18.2 to 32.5 years (mean = 24.9), 
and they had worked in the stocking department from 24 months to 
6 years (mean = 2.33 years). They were also paid $10.00 per hour, 
worked a single shift between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. and 
were on the same incentive program as the stockers in the experimental 
center. The stocking tasks performed in each distribution center were 
identical. 
 
Task. The stocker’s job was to replenish the approximately 50,000 
bins located in the mezzanine in order for the picking crew to be able to 
satisfy the store orders later in the day. When a product was running low 
in a warehouse bin, a stocker was called upon to replenish the product. 
However, the stocker first relied on another associate to deliver product 
to the mezzanine. First, a driver operating a stock truck collected the 
needed cases of product(s) from remote bulk storage reserve areas in the 
warehouse. The stock-truck operator collected a “bundle” consisting of 
1-12 cases containing 5-10 products (see Figure 2). The driver then 
dropped off the pallet at a staging location at any one of the three levels 
of the mezzanine. 
 
Once the stock-truck operator completed the drop-off at the staging 
location, as seen in the warehouse diagram (Figure 3), the stockers received 
information about their next task via the stocker’s handheld 
wireless computer. Work became available to the stockers when they 
 
FIGURE 2. Two Bundles Ready for Stocking 
 
 
 
 
signed on to their respective handheld unit at the beginning of their shift 
or depressed the “enter” key to take on more work after the completion 
of the previous work unit. The screen on each stocker’s wireless computer 
would direct the stocker, where in the mezzanine the bundle was 
staged, and where these products were to be stocked. The stocker walked 
to the staging location shown on the handheld screen, located the bundle, 
and transferred the cases from the pallet to a hand-truck. The stocker received 
directions on the handheld computer indicating location of the 
bin into which each product was to be stocked and the number of cases 
needed to restock the bin. 
 
When the first product was restocked, the stocker depressed the “enter” 
key on the handheld computer. The computer indicated where and 
how many cases of the second product in the bundle were to be used 
to restock the bin. The stocker repeated this process until all products 
(work units) in the bundle were used to restock bins. 
 
From an operational standpoint, the ordering of the work units within 
the bundle was very important. Systematically, the Warehouse Management 
System (WMS) was programmed to order the work units based 
on the sequencing of the bins in the mezzanine. That meant the replenishment 
path was in one direction, one aisle at a time. 
 
It was important to have all the bins in the mezzanine adequately replenished 
in time so that later in the day when store orders were picked, 
no store order was “shorted” (product that is absent from the filled 
order). 
 
 
Apparatus: Handheld Wireless Computer 
 
The handheld wireless computers were Intermec Model CK30 (L = 
8.2", W = 2.8", H = 1.6") with a display window measuring 2.25" by 
2.25" (see Figure 4). The stocker screen, depicted in Figure 5, could display 
the following information, beginning with line 3: Line 3 shows the 
F(rom) location, case quantity, and the number of units within the case 
quantity; Line 4 shows the T(o) location, case quantity, and the number 
of units within the case quantity; Line 6 depicts the stock keeping unit 
number; Line 7 displays the product description; Line 10 shows the part 
 
FIGURE 4. Wireless Handheld Unit Used to Do Stocker Replenishment 
 
 
 
 
number; Line 11 identifies the pack (the number of measurable units 
with a bar-code inside a case) and repack (the number of retail units inside 
of the pack). Based on the screen depiction in Figure 5, the stocker 
was directed to take three cases from location HR12A1 and move them 
to location HP0422, cut open the three cases and deposit the 36 pieces of 
product from the case units into the bin container. 
 
The WMS, handheld computers, and same stocker screen were in 
place for over 4 years at both the experimental and control distribution 
centers prior to the current study. 
 
 
Productivity Measures 
 
After studying the stocking workforce, an industrial engineer and an 
organizational behavior management (OBM) professional determined 
the elements that constituted a replenishment “work unit” for a stocker: 
• travel time 
• box cutting time 
• stocking time 
 
The time-study software known as the Computer-Integrated Time 
Study was purchased from the Clemson Consulting Clearinghouse Corporation 
(www.C-Four.com) and ported onto Hewlett Packard handheld 
computers. 
 
A total of 70 hours of study and observation time for travel time, box 
cutting time, and stocking time were collected and entered into the computer’s WMS tables 
organized by aisle labeling that corresponded to the 
warehouse layout. 
 
Travel time was calculated as seconds per foot traveled based on the 
distance between the starting location and the ending location, taking 
into account corners and passageways. This was accomplished with a 
set of coordinates that mapped the entire warehouse. Box cutting time 
was based on product handling characteristics. For example, products 
requiring seven cuts, a master case and six inner cases, were assigned a 
cut time longer than products requiring a single cut. Each product was 
assigned a cut code. For example, a cut code “A” was for products requiring 
seven cuts. All “A” products were allocated a cut time of .8400 
minutes. Cut code “D,” on the other hand, was used for a product requiring 
a single cut and was thereby allocated a cut time of .2400 minutes. 
 
Stocking time was based on the number of cases per product going 
to the bin. Time was given for the first case, and additional time for the 
remaining cases. For example, if there were three cases being stocked 
for product A, the stocking time allocated for the first case might be 
calibrated at .1451 minutes and an additional .1045 minutes for each 
additional case. Thus stocking three cases summed to .3541 minutes. 
Additionally, stocking time was configurable for an aisle or a range of 
aisles. Many warehouses stock all like products in one aisle so there 
would be a “hoses” aisle, a “rotors” aisle, and a “filters” aisle, to name a 
few. Stocking times could be set to one value for the “hoses” aisle, another 
value for the “rotors” aisle, and yet another for the “filters” aisle. 
Depending on the product being stocked, the stocking time would be reflective 
of the aisle being stocked. 
 
Based on the individual element times, the standard time was calculated 
as: 
 
Standard Time = Travel Time + Box Cutting Time + Stocking Time 
 
The engineered standard time was calculated by the WMS computer 
for each unique work unit a stocker was asked to complete. By way of 
example, a standard time of 1.99 minutes for a work unit might comprise 
.4500 minutes travel time  + .5400 minutes box cutting time  + 
1.0000 minutes of stocking time. 
 
There was an underlying assumption that identical travel times (seconds 
per feet), box cutting times and stocking times would be comparable 
throughout the geographically disperse network of distribution centers. 
It was assumed that a normal walking pace, a normal cutting pace, and a 
normal stocking pace should be the same for associates working at any 
distribution center. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The engineered standard time was then compared with the actual time 
it took the stocker to get the one work-unit completed. Actual time was 
measured by time-stamps provided within the WMS software. The performance 
percentage was calculated as the engineered standard time 
(travel time + box cutting time + stocking time) versus the actual time it 
took to complete the work unit: 
 
Performance Percent = Standard Time/Actual Time 
 
The dependent variable was the “percent to standard” ratio calculated 
as Performance Percent = Standard Time/Actual Time. With Engineered 
Labor Standards, the Performance Percent was 100% if the 
stocker finished the assigned task in the same time as the standard required. 
If the Performance Percent was above 100% then the stocker 
finished the assigned task in less time than the standard required. For 
example, if the standard time was calculated to be 10 minutes and the 
actual work was done in 8 minutes, the performance percentage would 
show 125%. Likewise, if the Performance Percent was below 100% 
then the stocker finished the assigned task in more time than the standard 
required. For example, if the standard time was calculated to be 
10 minutes and the actual work was done in 12 minutes, the performance 
percentage would show 83.3%. 
 
The Performance Percent variable was then monitored on an electronic 
performance monitoring (EPM) screen (see Figure 6) viewable 
on a PC and an associated on-demand real-time report used by the supervisors 
to monitor activity. The replenishment supervisor accessed 
this screen periodically during the shift to monitor lunches, breaks, and 
 
 
employee performance. These daily EPM reports were then compiled 
by the company into monthly Performance Reports which were subsequently 
used by the research team to compile the dependent variable information 
for both the experimental and comparison distribution center. 
 
 
Existing Incentive Program 
 
Group bonuses were based on exceeding an announced and published 
quota posted in the break-room. For the stocking team it was an 
average of 18 cases per hour minimum, an average of 18.9 cases per 
hour for the $200 bonus and an average of 19.26 cases per hour for the 
$300 bonus. Other quotas for other functional teams, such as the receiving 
team, loading team, tire team, and order picking team, were also 
listed. If the average performance of the stocking team exceeded the 
18 cases per hour minimum quota by 5% (an average of 18.9 cases 
per hour) during a given month, a bonus of $200 was added to each 
stocker’s paycheck on the last paycheck of the following month. If the 
team exceeded the 18 cases per hour minimum quota by 7% (an average 
of 19.26 cases per hour) during a given month, a bonus of $300 was 
added to each stocker’s paycheck on the last paycheck of the following 
month. As a team-performance-based bonus program, however, members 
who individually exceeded the quota by 5 or 7%did not receive the 
bonus if the entire team average failed to exceed the quota at either of 
the two specified levels. As average team performance varied from 
month to month, so did bonus pay. It was noteworthy that the average 
team’s performance failed to produce a bonus on 4 of the last 9 baseline 
months. 
 
When an individual failed to achieve the published quotas over 
a 1-week period, disciplinary measures began with a verbal warning. 
A second failure within 3 months following the verbal warning resulted 
in a written warning with the employee placed on probation for 
3 months from the time of the second infraction. A third failure within 
the probationary period resulted in immediate dismissal. All disciplinary 
measures were officially documented by the immediate supervisor, 
co-signed by the operations manager, with a copy of the report sent to 
the regional human resource office, and a copy placed in the employee’s 
file. In the case of the stocking workforce, there were no disciplinary actions 
taken during the course of this study for either the experimental 
distribution center or the post hoc comparison distribution center. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
The current study used an ABC design with a 5-week baseline, a 2-week 
period where goal and performance feedback were depicted on the 
handheld computers, and a 10-week period where the existing incentive 
program was linked to performance feedback based on the engineered 
labor standards (see Table 1). A post hoc comparison distribution center 
with no goal and performance feedback on the handheld computers was 
used for comparison. 
 
 
Goals and Feedback Based on Performance Percentages 
 
After the baseline period the handheld computer screen was enhanced 
to depict GOAL (standard time of the current of work unit to be 
performed) and PERF% feedback (standard time divided by actual time 
of the immediately previous completed work unit). Each time the stocker 
 
 
 
depressed the “enter” key on the handheld unit to obtain the next work 
unit, the screen showed the next product in the bundle along with the 
new goal for the next work unit and the performance percentage from 
the previously completed work unit (see Figure 7). 
 
For example, a GOAL time of 1.99 minutes represented the engineered 
time of the current work unit and a PERF of 103.77 represented 
the performance percentage of the previous work unit. This information 
informed the stocker that he or she was working “on-time.” If, however, 
the PERF indicator was showing a performance percent of 82%, then the 
stocker received feedback that he or she was behind the goal and needed 
to decrease the time to complete the work. Falling behind or getting 
ahead did not affect subsequent GOAL times because each work unit’s 
calculation was an independent event. 
 
At the outset of the intervention the stockers saw the new screen 
showing GOAL and PERF%. The 23 stockers were assembled for a task 
clarification meeting conducted by the Industrial Engineer. The meeting 
involved a description of the new algorithm and its components, 
a demonstration of the new screen, and a question-and-answer period. 
The stockers were told there would be “a couple weeks” before the 
 
 
 
existing incentive program would incorporate the engineered standards 
and the new information on the screen. They were told, for the time being, 
the only change was that the GOAL and PERF% would be displayed 
on the handheld to get them used to viewing the new screen. The 
2-week period of viewing the goal and performance feedback permitted 
assessment of any performance changes owing to task clarification 
or the introduction of the new screen. Otherwise the quotas and bonus 
structure remained the same. 
 
 
Adaptation of the Incentive Program 
 
Following the 2-week period when employees were asked to become 
acquainted with the GOAL and PERF% information, the operations 
manager called a meeting with the stocking associates at the start of the 
shift and announced that the adaptation of their incentive program based 
on the new engineered standards and performance feedback would begin 
and described how it would work. 
 
Arrays of contingency-specifying statements were made in the presence 
of the employees during this meeting (Huber, 1986; Johnson, 
Mawhinney, & Redmon, 2001). The operations manager met with the 
stocking crew at the beginning of the shift and clearly stated that “engineered 
standards and performance monitoring were now in effect” and 
that each stocker was “expected to be at 100% performance.” Furthermore, 
“there would be a one-week grace period after which time-related 
disciplinary actions would be in effect” and that “making share [bonus] 
was dependent upon achieving the previously established quotas for the 
team.” The operations manager reviewed the quotas and the bonus 
structure and specifically described the two discrete levels of $200 per 
person for the month for stocking an average of 18.9 cases per hour and 
$300 per person for the month for stocking an average of 19.25. The operations 
manager explained that “on the new standard, whether you 
have a large bundle or a small bundle, many cuts or several cuts, you’ll 
be given credit for exactly the work you are doing, so your percentage 
will reflect your effort. You will be given time based on the distance you 
have to travel, the number of cartons, and the number of cuts. If you 
average 100% as a team, the 18-case quota will be exceeded and everybody 
will get a bonus.” 
 
As part of their daily warehouse meetings, the operations manager 
and replenishment manager printed the on-demand labor report in order 
to insure members of the stocker replenishment workforce individually 
and as a team maintained the goal of 100%. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
The stocker performance percentage using engineered labor standards 
for the Experimental Distribution Center and the Comparison 
Distribution Center across the three experimental phases are depicted 
in Figure 8. During the baseline phase (day 1 through 23) the average 
stocker performance at the experimental distribution center was 82.9% 
of the engineered labor standard, with a range from 72.2 to 93.6% (SD = 
6.08). This corresponded to an average of 18.32 cases stocked per hour 
per person. This was consistent with the 18-case quota that had been in 
force for almost 12 months. 
 
During the first intervention phase (24-30 days) when the wireless 
handheld computers provided GOAL and PERF%, the average stocker 
performance at the experimental distribution center was 82.3% of the 
engineered labor standard, with a range from 69.3 to 95.2% (SD = .57). 
This corresponded to an average of 18.43 cases stocked per hour per 
person, also consistent with the 18-case quota. 
 
During the second intervention phase (31-84 days) bonus pay contingencies 
were in effect based on PERF% configured to the ELS, the 
average stocker performance of the 23 associates at the experimental 
distribution center was 99.8% of the engineered labor standard with a 
range from 92 to 111% (SD = 4.09). The performance percentage increased 
almost to 100% immediately on the first day the engineered 
labor standards were announced. 
 
As Table 2 shows, the individual performance of the 23 stockers 
at the experimental distribution center one day prior to the operations 
 
 
 
 
 
manager’s contingency specifying statements meeting compared with 
the same individual’s performances on the day of the meeting, the increase 
corresponded to an average of 22.89 cases stocked per hour per 
person, an increase of an additional 4.46 cases per hour per person. The 
t-test result for related samples was 6.84, which was statistically significant 
(df = 22, p < .001). 
 
The stocker percentage performance within the post hoc comparison 
distribution center, as depicted in Figure 8, had all warehouse points 
mapped out but had not implemented engineered labor standards and 
showed neither the GOAL nor the PERF% on the handhelds. The average 
stocker performance was 80.18% of the engineered labor standard, 
with a range from 62.6 to 93.5% (SD = 6.25) spanning 84 work days. 
This corresponded to an average of 18.02 cases stocked per hour per 
person, also consistent with the 18-case quota. 
 
 
Costs and Benefits 
 
The cost of the intervention was the professional time of both the Engineer 
and OBM consultant (which included software development) 
equated to about 240 person-hours (the equivalent of 6 weeks of pay, 
calculated at a total of $12,000) spanning 6 months (3 months baseline 
which comprised of time-studies and programming time). 
 
It is noteworthy that the workforce benefited by making incentive 
pay for 9 consecutive months after the implementation of the intervention. 
Furthermore, notes from weekly warehouse meetings show that 
prior to the intervention, there were occasions where the stocking team 
received no incentive pay for a given month. There were no hardware 
costs, as the RF units were already part of the warehouse activity. Over 
the 9 months following the adaptation of the incentive program, the 
company paid out additional bonuses in excess of $62,000 for 9 consecutive 
months of bonus money at the $300 level compared to the 
9 months prior to the intervention where the stocker team only earned 
five bonuses, valued at $25,300, with only one occurrence at the $300 
level (4 months at $200 for 23 associates for $18,400 and 1 month at 
$300 for 23 associates for $6,900). Annualized, it can be estimated that 
this program would cost the company an additional $36,800 a year in 
employee bonuses. 
 
The benefits of the new labor standards, feedback, and incentives 
were measured in the reduction of labor hours needed to complete the 
work and associated cost reductions. During baseline, the average cases 
stocked per hour was 18.43 per stocker. At the end of the intervention, 
stockers were consistently stocking 22.89 cases per hour. This is 
an increase of 4.46 cases selected per hour per stocker. This equates to 
an increase of 820 cases per 8-hour work day across all 23 stockers. 
Therefore, if the company asks their stockers to stock an average of 18 
cases per hour, we can estimate that the company saved 45-stocker 
hours a day because of the increased productivity seen during the intervention. 
Stockers were paid an average of $10.00 per hour for approximately 
18 cases per hour. Thus a good estimate of savings per day in 
stocker time would be $450 per day. Therefore, for the 10 week incentive 
period in this study, comprised of 53 work days, it is estimated that 
for the period of the study, the warehouse saved $23,850 in stocker 
labor costs. Annualized, the savings were estimated to be nearly $117,000, 
calculated as $450 per day, 5 days a week, for 52 weeks. Given the estimated 
savings, the stocking team size could be reduced if the pre-intervention 
performance levels satisfied the daily demand for restocking. 
The reduction in workforce could be accomplished either through transferring 
some stockers to other areas of the warehouse when staffing levels 
in those areas fell below staffing needs, or through attrition within 
the stocking group. 
 
Additionally, hours of overtime, paid at a rate of one and a half times 
normal wages, were reduced from 108 hours during the 9-month period 
before the intervention to only 10 hours during the 9 months after implementation 
of the intervention. Thus, overtime was reduced from, a baseline 
cost of $1,620 (108 hours * $15.00), to a reduced cost of $150 (10 
hours * $15.00) with the intervention. This represented an additional 
savings of $1,470 ($1,620-$150) during those 9 months for an annualized 
savings of $1,960. 
 
Annualized, these reductions in labor costs and paid overtime would 
result in benefits of over $118,000. In conclusion, the benefits of the intervention 
program and its continued use more than covered its costs, 
estimated at $12,000 for the one-time cost of the Industrial Engineer 
and the OBM professional’s time and an additional recurring cost of 
$40,000 in added bonuses (culminating in approximately $80,000 a 
year in incentive system bonuses). And, under the assumption that the 
stockers’ performance levels would be maintained, perhaps for years, 
these saving would accumulate to even more practically significant levels 
through the years. 
 
The system is still in effect, in large part, owing to the satisfaction of 
the workforce and management. One of the comments stockers have repeatedly 
stated is “It helps keep me focused.” Another stocker commented 
that “I make more money with the bonus than I would with a 
pay raise.” That is because a $0.50 raise per hour is only $80.00 more 
per month as compared with the $300.00 more per month as a result of 
earning the maximum monthly bonus. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study showed how an OBM intervention package could be accomplished 
with computer technology and labor-management practices 
to increase productivity. The OBM tactics of proximal goals, immediate 
performance feedback, and contingent rewards were used in conjunction 
with handheld wireless technology to increase productivity in a 
warehouse setting. 
 
As each work unit was presented to the stocking associate, he or she 
was given the goal-time for the current work unit as well as performance 
feedback on the work unit just completed. As a result each 
stocker maintained 100% productivity via combined goal-setting and 
feedback throughout the day and received a monetary bonus at the end 
of the month. 
 
The intervention described and assessed in the present study was 
initiated by an OBM professional when confronted an organizational 
performance problem. The problem took the form of a group-based 
monetary performance incentive system that did not consistently produce 
the level of performance it was supposed to support. A theoretical 
analysis of the problem suggested that while the group-based 
monetary incentives seemed large enough ($200 and $300 per group 
member) to support high consistent performances, the month-long delay 
between performances achieved and receipt of incentive payments 
may have reduced the salience of these consequences. The problem 
solution selected for implementation was based on OBM theories 
regarding temporal proximity among antecedent goal specifications, 
participants’ performance-related responses to the goal specifications, 
and feedback regarding degree to which each task goal was achieved 
from moment-to-moment during every work day. Temporal proximity 
of goals and feedback regarding their accomplishment was achieved 
task-by-task and virtually moment-by-moment. The expectation that 
the wireless handheld technology and ELS used to provide goals and 
immediate feedback would result in reinforcement of higher performance 
rates among stocker-participants was based, in part, on the assumption 
that these elements of the intervention were highly likely to 
increase the salience of the group-based monetary incentives. 
Higher performance rates were achieved by increasing salience of 
minute-by-minute proximate (Baum, 1994). A: BÆC goal and performance 
feedback contingencies in the context of a monetary incentive 
contingency that was in place before, during, and after the intervention. 
 
Previously during baseline, the bonus was based on a three-term contingency 
that may be described as: 
Distal SD) quota announced at the beginning of shift; 
R) stocking product; 
Distal SR) feedback and possible monetary bonus delivered 
the next month. 
 
In essence the intervention enacted the following enhancement (in 
italic) to the baseline contingencies: 
Distal SD) quota announced at the beginning of shift; 
Proximal SD) GOAL appearing on screen at the beginning of 
each work unit; 
R) stocking product; 
Proximal SR) PERF% appearing on screen at the end of each 
work unit; 
Distal SR) feedback and possible monetary bonus delivered 
the next month. 
 
A key to the success of the OBM package was the delivery of the contingency- 
specifying statements (Huber, 1986; Johnson, Mawhinney, & 
Redmon, 2001) orally during group meetings wherein clarifying questions 
could be fielded. The Industrial Engineer’s explanation of the program 
was thought to be crucial to the stockers’ understanding of the GOAL 
and PERF% information, and the operations manager’s explanation of 
the adapted incentive program to the ELS was thought to be crucial to 
the stocker’s understanding of the minute-to-minute salience of the incentive 
contingency. 
 
Performance of the stockers increased immediately following the 
announcement of the engineered labor standard and remained at near 
100% for the duration of the 10-week intervention phase (C). The major 
findings of the present study are consistent with previous OBMr esearch 
(Bateman & Ludwig, 2003; Nicol & Hantula, 2001; Pritchard, Jones, 
Roth, Stuebing, & Ekeberg, 1988; Tjosvold, 1986) in that they add to the 
body of empirical evidence supporting the fact that incentive programs, 
when properly supported with feedback, can increase desired performance. 
In addition, however, this study demonstrated that (1) computer 
technology can be used to deliver proximate goals and immediate feedback 
and (2) that these proximate goals and immediate feedback can be 
added to an existing incentive contingency to produce practically significant 
productivity gains. 
 
However, caution is advised because the ABC design did not include 
reversals. While a reversal of treatment effects would have provided 
stronger evidence regarding the causal role of the intervention in the 
performance improvements observed, reversal designs are not well tolerated 
by owners and managers. The resistance to reversal of positive 
effects noted by Gaetani, Hoxeng, and Austin (1985) was encountered 
here. In a field setting such as this one, gains in realism may well offset 
concerns with internal validity (Komaki & Goltz, 2001). Nevertheless, 
we attempted to offset this limitation by using data from a post hoc comparison 
distribution center where productivity remained unchanged 
during the same time frame as the experimental intervention. This suggested 
that performance increases might have been associated with the 
intervention package rather than some uncontrolled variable or confound. 
In the future, an even more closely matched comparison group 
could be used or, if possible, workers could be randomly assigned as a 
control group from the same facility. 
 
Another caveat concerns the potential effects of the disciplinary contingencies 
that were in place throughout the baseline and intervention 
phases of the study. For example, the new system, in addition to providing 
stockers with precise task goal specifications, provided the same information 
to supervisors, thus making it likely that supervisors could 
more efficiently engage in surveillance of stockers. If stockers noticed 
the increased ease with which supervisors and management might track 
their performances, the disciplinary contingencies carried over from the 
baseline contingencies into the intervention may also have become 
more salient. The disciplinary contingencies were, more likely than not, 
avoidance contingencies that would likely be experienced as aversive 
but might, nevertheless, have contributed to increased performance levels 
upon implementation of the intervention package. 
 
Unfortunately, about the only way to test for effects of this sort of 
contingency would be to remove the group goal and individual incentive 
payments based on group goal achievements. Another way to address 
the issue would be to collect job satisfaction data (Mawhinney, 
1989) prior to intervention and after the intervention had been in place 
for some time. Another way in which aversive effects of interventions 
may be manifest among participants is increased absences. For example, 
Wilk and Redmon (1990) notice a spike in the recorded hours of absence 
that occurred during the second of 26 intervention observations 
following introduction of daily-adjusted goal-setting among participants 
in a university admissions office. However, that spike was followed 
by a reduction in both the level and variation in absences for the 
remaining 24 biweekly observations. In the future, therefore, it would 
make sense to collect job satisfaction data and/or track hours of absence 
from work or whatever measure archived by host organizations as a 
means of assessing the degree to which intervention contingencies constitute 
improvements in the “quality of work life” on the job in addition 
to improvements in organizational efficiency. 
 
It should be mentioned that monetary rewards before, during, and after 
the intervention were still tied to cases per hour (i.e., 18 cases per 
hour). An alternative for future studies (and future real-world applications) 
would be to tie the monetary rewards to the precisely measured 
5% above the ELS for the month would merit a $200 bonus; and 7% 
above the ELS would merit a $300 bonus. The benefit to tying monetary 
rewards to the ELS is that it takes into consideration the travel time, cutting 
time, and stocking time. In short, it is a more valid measure of performance 
than cases per hour. 
 
Using the engineered labor standard approach accentuated the fact 
that benchmarking, using cases per hour, 18 cases per hour in this case, 
was not as “productive” as had been announced, published, and posted 
in the break room. It is reasonable to argue that the quota should be revised 
to reflect performance in terms of the ELS. Once the work unit 
was engineered to incorporate travel time, cutting time, and stocking time 
in performance standards, and immediately following the announcement 
of the engineered labor standard and the OBM package (goal time, 
performance percent, and monetary rewards), the stocking associates 
began stocking an additional 4.46 cases per hour per person. It is imperative, 
however, that the engineered labor standard be kept up to date, requiring 
that the cut codes and stocking times for new products be 
maintained at all times. If the standard is not kept current it will have a 
short shelf life, its validity will likely fall, and, more likely than not, 
benefits of the initial investment will eventually decline. In a worse case 
scenario the required time to complete tasks might raise while the specified 
time remained constant. This would require stockers to work at 
higher speeds simply to “stay even” relative to quota achievement and 
also make it likely they would eventually fail to earn bonuses in spite of 
working harder than ever. This would be equivalent to what in the past 
was called incentive rate cutting. 
 
Behaviorally, we suspect that when a work unit was completed, say, 
at 90% performance, the stocker would walk a little faster and stock a 
little faster to make up the deficit for the next bundle or two. This 
has important implications regarding occupational safety. This study 
took into account fatigue by performing observations and time studies 
early in the shift, during the middle of the shift, and at the end of the 
shift; otherwise if we had observed the associates only at the beginning 
of the shift where everyone was generally alert and attentive, and we 
had used only those timings, it would have been possible for the number 
of accidents to increase as tired employees hurried to get their work on 
time as the end of the shift drew closer in time. 
 
The host company performed periodic audits verifying the accuracy 
of the standard, including fatigue, in its calculations. Overall, the company 
recorded no accidents during the course of this study and continues 
to have one of the lowest accident rates in the industry. It is important 
that the engineered standard represent a “normal” workflow which can 
only be achieved by continual study and observation. 
 
In future studies researchers should review safety records to determine 
whether accident rates are associated with workers attempting 
to make up for lower performance rates. Additionally, future studies 
should attempt to confirm this possible connection between worker behavior 
and accident rates by direct observations of work-related behavior 
among individual workers, including workers in other functional 
areas of the warehouse. 
 
Although this study was able to verify the immediate benefits of linking 
OBM methods (proximate goals and immediate feedback) with performance 
technology (handheld computers), there are several practical 
challenges maintaining effectiveness of such performance management 
systems. Because this industry experiences 40-60% turnover annually 
in the workforce, practical ways of promoting job satisfaction are important 
(Mawhinney, 1984). The host company has implemented initiatives 
for retaining the workforce by promoting job rotation. From the 
standpoint of variety, feedback, reducing boredom, and stress, job rotation 
has the added benefit of improving the workforce skills and improving 
the flexible use of the workers (Beehr, Jex, & Ghosh, 2001). 
It is interesting to note that there was no turnover in the stocking workforce 
during the period of examination because, in general, stocking 
small parts off of a hand-truck is considered a far easier task than, say, 
picking tires, batteries, or bulky items, where much of the turnover seems 
to occur. 
 
The OBM deliverable, then, is not merely placing the goal or the feedback 
on a wireless computer, or the intervention, or the technology. The 
OBM deliverable must be part and parcel of sound operational principles. 
Otherwise you end up applying labor standards to bad practices and the 
engineered labor standard and the OBM component may be eventually 
misused, or worse, discarded. 
 
When the WMS is integrated with a labor component that is tied to 
incentives, rather than just a warehouse management system, one that 
enables the warehouse to respond to order fulfillment and inventory 
control, the result is a managed warehouse system–one that supports 
warehouse information, business processes, warehouse activity, and 
performance monitoring. 
 
As more and more distribution centers go “paperless” the often distal 
relationship between goal-setting and performance feedback can be 
shifted to real-time, and as seen in this study, the impact on stocker performance 
may be immediate and sustained. We see that various functions 
of the warehouse, such as order selecting (Bateman & Ludwig, 
2003) and now stocker replenishment, can be better managed by applying 
sound Organizational Behavior Management principles, whether it 
has to do with increasing accuracy, as reported by Bateman and Ludwig 
(2003), or increased productivity reported here. The benefit of doing the 
job right means the ability to manage proper staffing levels, improving 
productivity by providing a full workload for every associate and the reduction 
of overtime. When performance is tied to bonuses, share, and 
other incentives, companies often achieve better employee retention, a 
reduction of overtime, higher employee satisfaction, higher employee 
motivation, fewer accidents, fewer errors, and better quality of work 
(Richards, 1986). 
 
Finally, the expanding role of the OBM professional in creating solutions 
and implementing effective interventions and feedback systems in 
warehouse settings should continue to be documented. Studies such as 
this demonstrate that with the help of an OBM professional, the implementation 
of expensive technologies and complex labor practices (e.g., 
incentive programs that are individualized or team-based) can be better 
optimized to change employee behavior for the mutual benefit of the 
company and the employee. 
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